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COMMENT
THE PRICE WE PAY FOR PORNOGRAPHY: A KARAMAZOV VIEW
ARGUMENTS against giving first amendment' protection to
pornography and obscenity2 are consistently made from a soci-
etal perspective. The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that obscenity is not protected speech because of the harm such
material causes to "the social interest in order and morality."'
Similarly, critics of pornography have argued that the harms to
society resulting from the distribution of pornographic materials
outweigh any first amendment benefits.' Inherent in the Supreme
Court's definition of obscenity is the idea that material is not ob-
1. The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. Although the first amendment
says "Congress shall make no law," the Supreme Court has carved out a number of excep-
tions to that restriction. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)(hold-
ing that a newspaper may be sued for libel if the plaintiff proves "actual malice"); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957)(first amendment does not
protect obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)("there are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem").
2. Obscenity, which is not protected speech, differs from pornography. "The term
'obscenity' refers to indecency and filth; the term pornography. . . refers to materials that
treat women as prostitutes and that focus on the role of women in providing sexual pleasure
to men." Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 595.
Generally, pornography that is not legally obscene cannot be banned under the present
Supreme Court doctrine. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
1029 (3d ed. 1986). The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography defined pornog-
raphy as material that "is predominantly sexually explicit and intended primarily for the
purpose of sexual arousal." I ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 228-29 (1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
3. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). See also Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15, 17-23 (1973).
4. See MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL REV. 321, 322-24 (1984).
"[P]ornography causes attitudes and behaviors of violence and discrimination which define
the treatment and status of [women]." Id. at 324. See also Sunstein, supra note 2, at 596-
97, 601; Note, Anti-Pornography Laws and First Amendment Values, 98 HARv. L. REV.
460, 470-72, 475 (1984).
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scene if it benefits society.5
One problem with balancing the societal harm caused by the
distribution of pornography against the accompanying first
amendment benefits is that commentators and studies have been
unable to reach a consensus as to what the effects of pornography
are on society.6 Meanwhile, substantial resources are exhausted as
the courts struggle to determine what material contributes so little
value to society that it should be labeled obscene. Furthermore,
costly studies conducted on the effects of pornography have been
inconclusive.7
This Note will present an alternative to the legal and socio-
logical viewpoints which require an expensive determination of the
quantitative harms of pornographic material to society. By utiliz-
ing an argument from outside the realm of legal scholarship, it
will propose a more individualized look at the harm created by
such materials, as opposed to a general societal view. First, this
Note will briefly discuss some of the Supreme Court cases ad-
dressing obscenity and pornography. Second, this Note will apply
a renowned argument from Fyodor Dostoevsky's The Brothers
Karamazov to argue that the harm to one is not worth the benefit
to the many. Finally, this Note will analyze the argument
presented, concluding that the focus of many commentators in this
area is misplaced.
I. PORNOGRAPHY IN THE COURTS
As long ago as 1942, the United States Supreme Court has
suggested that the "lewd and obscene" are among "certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
5. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
6. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 600. "Other social factors, including demographic
and ethical trends, may account for simultaneous increases in both pornography and vio-
lence - though some of the studies try to control for these possible distortions. Objections
of these sorts of course do not disprove a connection; they do suggest, however, that the
empirical data are imperfect." Id.
7. See OJJDP Concedes Flaws in Study of Cartoons in Adult Magazines, CRIM.
JusT. NEWSL., Dec. 1, 1986, at 6 (The Federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP) spent $734,000 on a study of links between cartoons in adult
magazines and sexual abuse of children. The OJJDP, however, decided not to officially
issue the report because of its serious flaws.); Attorney General's Panel Calls for War on
Pornography, CRIM. JUST. NEWSL., June 2, 1986, at 1-2 (The extensive Attorney General's
Commission Report on Pornography, which took over one year to complete, caused disa-




punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Consti-
tutional problem." 8 The justification for this exclusion from first
amendment protection is that it will benefit society as a whole:
"[A]ny benefit that may be derived from [such classes of speech]
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity."9 The Court's first decision on the subject, Roth v. United
States,10 created the foundation for later cases dealing with ob-
scene materials.11 In Roth, the Court held that "obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press. '12
Eleven years afer Roth, in Ginsberg v. United States, the Su-
preme Court upheld a statute which prohibited the selling to chil-
dren of nude pictures which are "harmful to minors."13
The current test for obscenity was enunciated in Miller v.
California.4 The Miller test asks:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value.15
In Miller, the Court reaffirmed "the Roth holding that obscene
material is not protected by the first amendment, ' 16 while vacat-
ing and remanding the conviction of the defendant who had
mailed unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of a Cali-
fornia statute.'7 Under the Miller test, speech which is valuable to
society - speech with "serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value" - is not obscene, and is therefore protected speech.
In Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Founda-
tion,'8 the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) could regualte a radio
8. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
9. Id. at 572.
10. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957).
11. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 1011.
12. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
13. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
14. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
15. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 36.
17. Id. at 37.
18. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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broadcast that is indecent but not obscene. 9 Pacifica involved an
FCC declaratory order granting a complaint against a radio sta-
tion for broadcasting a monologue by satiric humorist George
Carlin entitled "Filthy Words."20 Although Pacifica, unlike the
other cases discussed in this Note, involved the broadcast medium,
it is still relevant in that it allowed sanctions for speech which was
indecent, but not obscene.2 Another factor worthy of notice in the
Court's decision was its concern over the broadcast's effect on
children. Pointing out that broadcasting is accessible to children,
the Court stated "that the government's interest in the 'well-being
of its youth' and in supporting 'parents' claim to authority in their
own household' justified the regulation of otherwise protected
expression."22
The Supreme Court confronted the issue of child pornogra-
phy in New York v. Ferber,23 where it upheld the constitutionality
of a New York statute which prohibited persons from knowingly
promoting a visual sexual performance by a child under the age of
sixteen by distributing, disseminating, or advertising material
which depicts such a performance.24 The Court focused on the
statute's role in protecting young children from being used as per-
formers, not on the effect of such material on its viewers.2 5 In ex-
amining the state's interest in protecting children, the Court
claimed that the obscenity test from Miller was inadequate to
protect children from exploitation.2" By concluding that the New
York statute was not substantially overbroad, the Court upheld
that statute's definition of child pornography, which did not re-
quire the banned material to be obscene:
The court adjusted the Miller test for obscenity as follows for
child pornography: the trier of fact need not find that the mate-
rial appeals to the prurient interests of the average person, it is
not required that the sexual conduct be portrayed in a patently
offensive manner, and the material at issue need not be consid-
ered as a whole.17
19. Id. at 750-51.
20. Id. at 729, 730.
21. Id. at 739-41.
22. Id. at 749 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)).
23. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
24. Id. at 750-51.
25. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 1022.
26. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760-61.
27. Annotation, Validity and Construction of 18 USCS § 371 and 2252(a) Penaliz-
ing Mailing or Receiving, or Conspiring to Mail or Receive, Child Pornography, 86 A.L.R.
1398 [Vol. 39:1395
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The Ferber Court reasoned that the harm to society resulting
from using children as sexual performers outweighed any benefits
to society from the distribution of such material. The harm to so-
ciety resulted from the harm to the children forced to perform.28
Unlike statutes punishing the distribution of pornographic materi-
als because of their effect on viewers, the statute in Ferber was
aimed at preventing "the abuse of children who are made to en-
gage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes."2 9 This distinc-
tion is important, because in Ferber the connection between the
pornography and the victim was clear. No studies were necessary
to find a relationship between the pornography and the harm to
the performing children. Furthermore, the harm to society was
magnified because children were involved. The Court explained
that "'[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens.' "30 The Court argued that the harm to society out-
weighed any benefits resulting from the use of children as sexual
performers: "The value of permitting live performances and pho-
tographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual con-
duct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimus."' 1
Two aspects of the Ferber decision appear important to the
Court's holding that the harm outweighed the benefits. First, it
seemed important to the Court that the connection between the
pornography and the harm to a number of children was clear.
Had the statute been aimed at banning child pornography because
such material encourages child abuse, the Court would have prob-
ably struck down the statute. Indeed, the Court condoned the use
of a person over sixteen years of age, who looked younger, if such
material had literary or artistic value.32 The Court did not seem to
be concerned with the pornography's effect on its viewers.
A second important aspect of the Court's decision was that
the child pornography under consideration was not alleged to have
artistic, literary, educational, or scientific value. The majority was
unclear as to what role such a value would play.33 The justices
who concurred, however, explicitly disagreed on whether child
FED. 360, 363 (1988).
28. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 750-59.
29. Id. at 753.
30. Id. at 757 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)).
31. Id. at 762.
32. Id. at 763.
33. Id. at 761, 763, 773.
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pornography with artistic, literary, educational, or scientific value
could be banned in order to protect the child performer. 4
II. REBELLION
The previously discussed Supreme Court cases have illus-
trated a number of themes in this area of the law. First, there is a
strong interest in protecting "speech" which is valuable to society.
Second, society has a strong interest in protecting its children.
Third, if the connection between the speech and the harm to soci-
ety is sufficiently direct, the harm will be found to outweigh any
benefits resulting from the speech. This third theme raises the
questions of how direct the connection and how great the harm
must be to deny the "speech" first amendment protection. Ferber
appeared to require a fairly direct connection between the speech
and the harm, but the Court did not answer the question of how
many child victims must be harmed to outweigh any benefits from
the "speech." The next part of this Note adapts an argument from
The Brothers Karamazov3 5 to answer that question. It intertwines
its analysis with the three themes taken from the Supreme Court
cases and concludes that all pornography should be banned. The
argument is presented in a manner which parallels Ivan
Karamazov's discussion with his brother, Aloysha, in the novel.
A. An Adaption of an Argument from Ivan Karamazov36
There are a number of examples of pornography's role in
34. In Ferber, Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion to stress that the com-
pelling interests indentified by the majority "suggest that the Constitution might in fact
permit New York to ban knowing distribution of works depicting minors engaged in ex-
plicit sexual conduct, regardless of the social value of the depictions." Id. at 774. Justice
Brennan, however, was joined by Justice Marshall in a concurring opinion which differed
with O'Connor on this issue. Brennan argued that application of any such "statute to de-
pictions of children that in themselves do have serious literary, artistic, scientific, or medi-
cal value, would violate the First Amendment." Id. at 776.
35. F. DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (A. MacAndrew trans. 1970).
36. The foundation for the argument comes from The Brothers Karamazov, a novel
by Fyodor Dostoevsky. The argument in the novel is used in a different context, when one
of the characters, Ivan Karamazov, refutes "the order of [God's] creation." E. SANDOZ,
POLITICAL APOCALYPSE: A STUDY OF DOSTOEVSKY's GRAND INQUISITOR 57 (1971). This
argument, entitled "Rebellion," along with Ivan's follow-up argument, "The Grand Inquis-
itor," have sparked considerable discussion and have spawned a number of books. See gen-
erally V. ROZANOV, DOSTOEVSKY AND THE LEGEND OF THE GRAND INQUISITOR (1972); E.
SANDOZ, supra. See also A. GIBSON, THE RELIGION OF DOSTOEVSKY 178-208 (1973).
Although at first it appears there is no connection between Ivan's argument and the
relationship between pornography and the first amendment, a closer look reveals that
1400 [Vol. 39:1395
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causing readers/viewers to perform violent acts against children. 7
Without assuming a direct connection in numerous instances, one
may easily find a connection in at least a few instances. Pornogra-
phy may affect everyone in society, but children are its most sym-
pathetic victims. For example, one child was found crucified on a
cross upon a mound of pornography.3 s It is disturbing to think of
the suffering that poor child endured while the nails were being
driven into his body.39 More recently, a twelve-year-old girl was
raped and murdered by a man who said that pornography stimu-
lated his appetite for murder.4 What benefits from pornography
Ivan's argument focuses on the suffering of children. Where Ivan uses the suffering of
children to refute God's order, this Note uses the suffering of children to refute the protec-
tion the first amendment supplies to pornography.
In the chapter entitled "Rebellion," Ivan Karamazov is trying to explain to his brother
Aloysha, a novice at a monastary, why he does "not accept and cannot accept . . . the
God-created world." F. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 35, at 283. After giving some examples of
atrocities committed against children, Ivan argues that the suffering of one child does not
justify any plan that God has for eternal harmony:
"I have no wish to be a part of their eternal harmony. It's not worth one single
tear of the martyred little girl who beat her breast with her tiny fist, shedding
her innocent tears . . . . It's not worth it, because that tear will have remained
unatoned for. And those tears must be atoned for; otherwise there can be no
harmony . . .. To me, harmony means forgiving and embracing everybody, and
I don't want anyone to suffer anymore. And if the suffering of little children is
needed to complete the sum total of suffering required to pay for the truth, I
don't want that truth, and I declare in advance that all the truth in the world is
not worth the price! ... I feel, moreover, that such harmony is rather over-
priced. We cannot afford to pay so much for a ticket ...."
"That's rebellion," Aloysha said softly, lowering his eyes.
Id. at 295-96.
Finally, Ivan puts his argument in the form of a question and asks his brother:
"[L]et's assume that you were called upon to build the edifice of human destiny
so that men would finally be happy and would find peace and tranquility. If you
knew that, in order to attain this, you would have to torture just one single
creature, let's say the little girl who beat her chest so desperately in the out-
house, and that.on her unavenged tears you could build that edifice, would you
agree to do it?"
Id. at 296.
Aloysha, understandably, answers "no." Id.
37. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 767-1037.
38. H. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY 141 (1969).
39. There is a reason for these explicit examples. Here, as in The Brothers
Karamazov, the argument relies on an appeal to emotion more than on a straightforward
logical analysis. These examples are necessary so that one may see the children as real
human beings who have suffered instead of just as statistics.
40. The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Jan. 29, 1989, at 6A, col. 3. The rapist/murderer,
Ted Bundy, is quoted: "[Pornography] snatched me out of my home 20, 30 years ago, and,
as dedicated as my parents were . . . and as good a Christian home as we
had . . . there is no protection against the kind of influences that are loose in [a] society
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could possibly justify her tears?
The harm to one child from the distribution of pornography
is great enough to outweigh any accompanying first amendment
benefits. Even if a pornographic film has a large scientific or artis-
tic value, the harm from allowing its distribution is too great. If
removing first amendment protection from pornographic materials
protects just one child, it is worth the sacrifice. Nothing can out-
weigh one child's suffering.
"[L]et's assume that you were called upon to build the edifice
of human destiny" so that men would have access to all the infor-
mation necessary to run their government effectively and to
achieve happiness. "If you knew that, in order to attain this, you
would have to torture just one single creature," let's say the
twelve-year-old girl raped and murdered by Ted Bundy, "and that
on her . . . tears you could build that edifice, would you agree to
do it?" 41
B. Legal Support
The argument that one child's suffering may outweigh any
societal benefits resulting from pornography is not directly incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court cases. Those cases illustrate a
strong concern for children. Where the connection between the
speech and the harm is clear for any single instance, the harm
seems to outweigh the benefits. It is not necessary for the Attor-
ney General to conduct studies on the relationship of pornography
to violence - one related incident is enough to justify a ban on all
pornography.
Still, inherent in cases such as Miller and Ferber is the belief
that the societal benefits from valuable speech outweigh any harm
to one individual. One may wonder whether the Court is correct in
assuming that there is a significant societal harm only where a
large number of children are directly harmed.
that tolerates (pornography)." Id.
Society may never know what really creates mass murderers like Bundy. Maybe it is
pornography; or maybe as the mass murderer in the song Nebraska explains, "I guess
there's just a meanness in this world." B. Springsteen, "Nebraska," NEBRASKA (Columbia
1982). Still, pornography does appear to have some role in a number of crimes. See FINAL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 767-835.
41. F. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 35, at 296.
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III. CONCLUSION
The argument presented in this Note is a very emotional one
and difficult to address rationally. It is not easy for one to say that
anything could outweigh the suffering of a single child. Still, this
argument could extend such a protectionist view too far and re-
move all meaning from the first amendment. The issue becomes
clouded when one talks about banning a medical textbook because
the pictures of nude children in it may fall into the wrong hands.
Also, the question of how much protection is overprotection arises
when one argues that the law must protect the most sensitive child
from the effects of all "harmful" novels or photographs. An advo-
cate of spanking children as a disciplinary measure could be cen-
sored to protect children from corporal punishment. Extending the
argument even further, one may ask whether the law should ban
all drain cleaners because the benefit to society of clear drains
does not outweigh the harm to the child who drank some of the
poison.
Perhaps protecting pornography does benefit society, and per-
haps somehow that benefit is great enough to outweigh the cost of
crucifying a helpless child upon a mound of pornography.42 Per-
42. The burden on the party seeking censorship is high under the generally accepted
first amendment doctrine applied by the courts:
A would-be censor must, under generally accepted first amendment doctrine,
persuade the democratic organ, and then a reviewing judge, that the censorship
decision was not motivated by a desire to silence the speaker because of the
censor's disagreement with the message. Second, the censor must persuade the
legislature, and then a reviewing judge, that the government's interest in censor-
ship is sufficiently significant to counter-balance a societal commitment to free
expression. Third, the censor must persuade both the legislature and the review-
ing judge that censorship is the only feasible way to safeguard the important
government interest. Finally, a censor must show a virtually certain causal nexus
between the target speech and the feared harm that allegedly justifies its
suppression.
Neuborne, Notes for a Theory of Constrained Balancing in First Amendment Cases: An
Essay in Honor of Tom Emerson, 38 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 576, 580-81 (1988)(footnotes
omitted). The requirement that censorship be the only possible way to safeguard the gov-
ernment interest imposes the most difficult burden on the censor of pornography under the
argument presented in this Note. The other requirements necessary to justify censorship
are more easily satisfied. The censor could satisfy the first requirement by arguing that the
governmental interest is preventing the harm caused by the pornography rather than regu-
lating the content of the "speech" itself. Under the second requirement, this Note's argu-
ment would hold that the government's interest in protecting an individual child is insur-
mountable. As for the causal nexus requirement, this Note would require such a nexus to
be shown for only one instance.
Another hurdle to implementing this Note's proposal is that in order to protect the
children, pornographers must be prevented from publishing, not just punished after they do
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haps there are better ways to protect the children, or maybe the
connection between crime and pornography is not clear enough.43
Still, the argument presented in this Note should not be dis-
regarded, just as the suffering of the child victims should not be
disregarded. Too much time and money is spent searching for a
relationship between pornography and the deterioration of the
moral fabric of our society. This time and money is wasted. The
efforts of legal commentators should not focus on the quantity of
harm. The harm to one child is enough for one to acknowledge
that the harm is very great. Instead, commentators should focus
their debates on the benefits our society obtains from allowing the
dissemination of pornography. The inquiry should not focus on the
nature of the harm (the harm is clear), but on the nature of the
benefits." The next step is to decide whether the benefits justify
the suffering. Finally, if the benefits do justify the harm, the
Court should look for a way to limit the harm.
Often there are ways to limit the harm without dimming the
benefits. First amendment protections can be precisely tailored to
avoid as much harm as possible. An argument such as the one
presented in this Note can be useful in distinguishing pornography
from other types of speech, and can aid in the formation of proper
first amendment categories for regulation. One commentator views
Ferber's role in first amendment analysis as supporting such a cat-
egorization of protected speech:
[W]hat appears on closer inspection of Ferber is a growing con-
publish such materials (although a very severe subsequent punishment may achieve the
same goal). The first amendment doctrine of prior restraint makes such government restric-
tions in advance of publication more likely to violate the first amendment than subsequent
punishments. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 503-12 (1970).
43. See supra note 6. Still, the argument in this Note requires a solid connection
between pornography and a violent act in only one instance.
44. There are arguments, however, that restrictions on pornography will actually
promote free speech. "More concretely, the argument goes, the pornography industry is so
well-financed, and has such power to condition men and women, that it has the effect of
silencing the antipornography cause in particular and women in general." Sunstein, supra
note 2, at 618.
Still, perhaps the best argument for protecting pornography, -violence on television,
and other culture-harming communications is that banning such speech would leave "the
government in control of all of the institutions of culture, the great censor and director of
which thoughts are good for us." American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323,
330 (7th Cir. 1985), afd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). See also T. EMERSON, supra note 42, at
467-515. "Erotic reading may be injurious in its long-term effects. But no one contends
that expression in any other area can be suppressed on such grounds. To do so would
destroy the system of freedom of expression." Id. at 499.
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sensus within the Court on a doctrinal proposition of great im-
portance in First Amendment theory - that the diversity of
communicative activity and government concerns is so wide as
to make it implausible to apply the same tests or analytical tools
to the entire range of First Amendment problems. This premise
provides the impetus for making First Amendment doctrine
more precise and at the same time more complex, developing
tools and tests that are greater in number but consequently ap-
plicable to increasingly smaller categories of First Amendment
issues. And as the size of the categories shrinks, it becomes less
necessary to protect that which ideally ought not to be protected
solely to ensure the protection of the potentially valuable. 5
In precisely tailoring the important protections offered by the first
amendment, courts .would do well to consider the twelve-year-old
girl who was raped and murdered and the boy who was crucified
upon a mound of pornography. If the courts fail at least to con-
sider the pain suffered by these individuals, the benefits of first
amendment protections will not be properly balanced in the inter-
ests of justice.
JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER
45. Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 285-317.
14051988-891

